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Articles
The Seigneurs Descend to the Rank of
Creditors: The Abolition of Respect, 1790
James Q. Whitman*
On the great night of August 4, 1789, the French National Assembly
proclaimed the abolition of feudalism. This momentous revolutionary
proclamation was not, however, self-executing: in the days that followed,
it became clear that there was no definitive agreement about what
"feudalism" was. After a week of uncertain debate, the gentlemen of the
Assembly had not produced fully detailed abolition legislation. Politics
having failed, the decision was made to turn the problem over to lawyers;
on August 12, the Assembly constituted a Committee, made up principally
of lawyers, and charged with the task of defining "feudalism."
So it was that the lawyers stepped in, to take charge of the first great
abolition of Western history. The special Committee on Feudal Rights
worked away during six months of increasing revolutionary tension, as
peasants rioted and chateaux burned in many parts of France. Finally, on
* This article is a revised and expanded version of "Les seigneurs descendent au rang de simples
crdanciers: Droit romain, droit fdodal, et R6volution," in Droits. Revue frangaise de th6orie juridique
17 (1993): 23. I would like to thank Professors Laurent Mayali, Olivier Beaud, James Gordley, and
participants in the Yale Law School Faculty Workshop for helpful comments.
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February 8, 1790, the Committee delivered a refined and elegant report, full
of technicalities and fine phrases. Among that report's pronouncements
was the following declaration: "the Seigneurs," reported the Committee,
analyzing the legal essence of the abolition of feudalism, "have descended
to the rank of simple Creditors."'
This elegant bit of Revolutionary legal analysis is my starting point in
this article. I want to explain what the Committee on Feudal Rights meant
when it analyzed the abolition of feudalism as meaning the reduction of
"seigneurs" to the rank of "creditors." French lawyers, I want to show, had
been struggling since the Reformation to enforce a distinction of rank
between "seigneurs"-a feudal legal category-and "creditors," a Roman
legal category. Until the great Revolution, it had been utterly unacceptable
that seigneurs should be identified with mere creditors, and French lawyers
made great efforts to prevent any collapse of the two categories. By
tracing the history of their efforts, I hope to give us a subtler sense of the
meaning of the Revolutionary abolition of feudalism. I also hope to give
us a subtler sense of the impact of Roman law in Europe, and push us
towards a subtler grasp of the importance of the enforcement of claims to
honor in legal history.
We are, I think, in need of some subtlety. For our existing accounts
have missed much of what is most interesting in this important revolution-
ary episode. Our existing accounts of this episode focus almost entirely on
economic concerns, and ascribe great importance to the prerevolutionary
spread of Roman law as a commercializing force. According to these
accounts, the Committee's 1790 declaration that the "seigneurs" had been
transformed into "creditors," elegant though it may have been, had no
practical meaning. For the "seigneurs" had already been transformed into
"creditors" long before the Revolution, as the result of the spread of Roman
law. Well before the Revolution, French lawyers had begun trying to
conceptualize feudal relationships in Roman terms. Through their efforts,
(so argue lay historians especially2) Roman commercial concepts had
1. "Rapport fait A l'Assemble Nationale au Nom du Comit6 de Feodalitd de 8 Fdvrier 1790 par
M. Merlin, Dhput6 de Douai," in Procs-Verbal de l'Assemble Nationale, vol. 13 (Paris, n.d.), 7. This
and comparable passages are quoted most conveniently in R. Robin, "Fief et Seigneurie dans le Droit
et l'Iddologie Juridique A la Fin du XVIIle Si~cle," in E. Schmitt, ed., Die Franzosische Revolution:
Anlasse und Langfristige Ursachen, Wege der Forschung 293 (Darmstadt, 1973), 507-11. (Originally
published in Annales Historiques de la Rivolution Franfaise 43 (1971): 554-602.) For these events,
see most recently F. Furet, "Night of August 4," in F. Furet and M. Ozouf, eds., A. Goldhammer, trans.,
A Critical Dictionary of the French Revolution (Cambridge, Mass., 1989), 107-13; and still especially
the learned account in M. Garaud, Histoire Gofngrale du Droit Privg Francais (de 1789 a 1804): La
Rdvolution et la Propri&t6 Foncikre (1958), 167ff.
2. The technical legal historians are of course more aware of the problems, though their work does
not seem to have entered the general literature. I will scatter complaints about even the technical
historians through these notes. For accounts relatively sensitive to the fragility of the use of Roman
law in the French countryside, see, e.g., Garaud, Histoire Gt4nerale, and see still F. Olivier-Martin,
Histoire du Droit Frangais des origines d la Rvolution (Monchrestien, 1951), 642ff. Among older
authors, see E. Garsonnet, Histoire des Locations Perpdtuelles et des Baux a Longue Durde (Paris,
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gradually eaten away at customary feudal concepts. By the mid-eighteenth
century, the process of "romanization ' 3 had already transformed French
agrarian society from a customary world of "seigneurs" and "vassals" into
a romanized world of "creditors," "debtors" and "real property owners."4
The often drawn corollary is that the lawyers of the Committee on
Feudal Rights were perpetrating a kind of reactionary pettifoggery.
According to this interpretation (still often repeated, though less heatedly
than in an earlier era) the Committee understood quite well that the feudal
"seigneurs" had already been transformed into Roman "creditors," that
France was already a commercial order, and that its declaration was
meaningless. But the lawyers were frightened by the growing social
disorder of the autumn and winter months of 1789-90, and they were
determined to undercut the abolition proclamation. Such was the purpose
of declaring the seigneurs to be "creditors." The declaration was a
"swindle" 5 which declared the peasants to be free, but in fact confirmed
their enslavement in a debtor-creditor order.6 The lawyers thus showed
themselves to be a thoroughly counterrevolutionary force, and the great
Revolution showed itself to be less a Revolution than a Ratification of
commercial changes long since effectuated.
Now, I do not wish to deny that these interpretations have large
elements of truth. It is true that "creditor" was a concept drawn from
Roman law. It is true that the availability of Roman law had produced
deeply disruptive, and to some extent commercializing, consequences
1879). Nevertheless, the classic German view of Heinrich Brunner, according to which French law was
most notably characterized by its "resistance" to Roman law, has found surprisingly little echo in the
French-language literature. See H. Brunner, GrundzUge der deutschen Rechtsgeschichte, 7th ed., ed.
E. Heymann (Munich, 1919), 264.
3. For this concept, see especially A. Piret, La Rencontre chez Pothier des Conceptions Romaine
et Fdodale de la Proprit6 Fonciare (Paris, 1937); and, e.g., V. Piano Mortari, Diritto Romano e Diritto
Nazionale in Francia nel Secolo XVI (Milan, 1962), 27ff.
4. Robin, "Fief et Seigneurie"; J.Q.C. Mackrell, The Attack on 'Feudalism' in Eighteenth-Century
France (London, 1973); Gerd van den Heuvel, "Fodalit6, Fkodal," in R. Reichardt and E. Schmitt, eds.,
Handbuch politisch-sozialer Grundbegriffe in Frankreich 1680-1820 (Mtinchen: Oldenbourg, 1988),
10:4ff.
5. J. Godechot, Les Institutions sous la Rdvolution et l'Empire (Paris, 1951), 163.
6. See most recently, P.M. Jones, The Peasantry in the French Revolution (Cambridge, England
1988), 81ff., citing earlier literature; E. Hinrichs, "'Feudalitht' und Ablosung: Bermerkungen zur
Vorgeschichte des 4 August 1789," in E. Schmitt, ed., Die Franzosiche Revolution, Neue Wissen-
schaftliche Bibliothek, 86 (K61n, 1976), 124-57. Even Furet, the inspiration of whose approach will
be obvious in this article, has not quite escaped this tradition. See now Furet, "Feudal System," in Furet
and Ozouf, Critical Dictionary, 687, which shows, I think, some of the continuing influence of Piret,
Rencontre chez Pothier, and Mackrell, Attack on 'Feudalism.' My interpretation is, I would
nevertheless like to think, one of which Professor Furet would approve; it fits with his general view that
the Revolution produced a kind of commercialization, see Furet, "Night of August 4," 113, while giving
a somewhat different account of what it was that was abolished. For another recent account that
emphasizes the commercializing consequences of the Revolution while avoiding some of the
conspiratorial analysis of the older school, see E. Botsch, Eigentum in der FranzOsischen Revolution:
Gesellschaftliche Konflikte und Wandel des sozialen Bewuptseins (Munich, 1992), 9 and often.
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before the Revolution. It is true that the Committee's report confirmed
most of the economic rights of the former seigneurs.
But despite these large elements of truth, I think that our existing
accounts have gotten it wrong. First, historians have made a significant
error in focusing so heavily on purely economic rights. As I will try to
show, the debate was far less about money than about the enforcement of
honor and social discipline: the Committee did abolish something, and what
it abolished was a system for the enforcement of respect that cannot be
understood in economic terms. Second, and equally significant, historians
have ascribed the wrong kind of importance to Roman law, and have
misjudged the role of the French legal profession. Roman law did serve,
in a very complex way, as a commercializing force. But the French legal
profession cannot be blamed for that. For the legal profession, far from
furthering the spread of Roman law, worked to combat the spread of
Roman law.
The real story of the work of the Committee on Feudal Rights, I want
to show, is more complex and more interesting. The story, as I will tell it,
will focus on one small but critically important seigneurial payment, called
the "cens," and it will run as follows: it is true that Roman law had a great
impact in the prerevolutionary world. Roman concepts were not inherently
commercial. But they were deeply alien to the customary feudal order of
medieval and early modern Europe, and their very alienness had a tendency
to break down feudal norms and thus open the way for commercialization.
In particular, Roman law broke all legal relations down into either personal
or real rights-something utterly foreign to the feudal world, which linked
real and personal rights inextricably in a system founded on concepts of
loyalty and trust. Medieval jurists who tried to conceptualize feudalism in
Roman terms were accordingly able to come up with only two inadequate
conceptualizations of feudal rights, one personal and one real. According
to the personal conceptualization, which came to be widely used in
prerevolutionary France, seigneurs were analogous to "creditors"; according
to the real conceptualization, which was widely used in prerevolutionary
Germany, seigneurs were analogous to "real property owners." These
Roman models were very different indeed from customary feudal
conceptualizations, and if they had been applied directly, they might rapidly
have changed feudal society both in France and in Germany.
But in point of fact, the Roman conceptualizations were not directly
applied. Lawyers in both countries7 were much too conservative to apply
anything so deeply disruptive, and they worked hard to neutralize any
disruptive effect Roman law might have. In France, in particular, lawyers
7. 1 will only discuss the French case here; the case of German difficulties with the servitude
analogy is extensively discussed in J. Whitman, The Legacy of Roman Law in the German Romantic
Era (Princeton, 1990), chap. 5.
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developed some elaborate practices to guarantee that seigneurs would not
be reduced to the status of mere creditors, but would retain an enforceable
right to demand "honor and respect." This idea of the enforcement of
"honor and respect" was pioneered by one of the great geniuses of
Reformation legal history, Charles Dumoulin, and it was imbued with
Reformation notions of Christian feudalism. But the enforcement of
Christian-feudal "honor and respect" survived long after the Reformation,
and indeed flourished in ancien regime legal life. It was this right to
demand "honor and respect," I will argue, that the much misunderstood
Committee on Feudal Rights abolished in 1790. And the abolition of
"honor and respect," I will suggest, was not an insignificant revolutionary
act, for its enforcement had played a large and obnoxious role in French
life before the Revolution.
At the end of the paper, I will offer some conclusions about French legal
reasoning, and I will try to make a case for the much neglected importance
of the enforcement of honor in law. We have failed fully to understand
this revolutionary episode because we are generally blind to the importance
of the legal interest in honor-an interest just as important, in many
societies, as the interest in money. Finally, in a Postscript, I will propose
a comparison with the very different world of the German-speaking
countries. German lawyers never developed doctrines of the French kind
about the enforcement of respect, and respect was in some sense never
abolished in Germany. By contrasting this German history with the French,
I will try to draw some conclusions about the importance of French law in
shaping the ultimate course of the Revolution.
I
To understand the work of the Committee on Feudal Rights in 1790,
we must begin deep in the Middle Ages, with medieval attempts to perform
an extremely difficult juristic task: to use Roman law to conceptualize
feudal relations.
Roman texts had great authority in medieval Europe, if only because they
came from ancient Rome,' and they were studied eagerly from the time of
the rediscovery of the Digest of Justinian in about 1100. But medieval
jurists found the Roman texts extraordinarily difficult to apply to European
countryside society. This was true partly because the details of the Roman
texts regulated an ancient society that was thoroughly different from
medieval society-one that included, for example, non-Christian institutions
8. For the motivations for the study of Roman law in the Middle Ages, see E. Cortese, "Scienza
di Giudici e Scienza di Professori tra XH e XIII Secolo," in Legge, Giudici, Giuristi. Atti del Convegno
Tenuto a Cagliari nei Giorni 18-21 Maggio 1981 (Milan, 1982), 93-148; A. Padoa-Schioppa, "Sul molo
dei giuristi nell'et, del diritto commune: un problema aperto," in II Diritto Commune e la Tradizione
Giuridica Europea (Perugia, 1980), 155-66.
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such as unrestricted divorce. But it was not just that the specific institu-
tions treated in the Roman texts had no European counterparts; there were
also profound differences in fundamental assumptions about the legal
world. Roman and feudal traditions gave different answers to the most
basic conceptual question of the law: the question of how persons relate to
each other and to things. In sorting out the relationships among persons
and things, the Roman texts tended to break all relations down into either
direct, unmediated relations between persons (obligations) or else into
direct, unmediated relations between persons and things (ownership). In
feudal relations in rural Europe, by striking contrast, the strong tendency
was to avoid division between obligations and ownership.
The difference showed most significantly in the law of real property. In
classic feudal society, as we very broadly reconstruct it,9 one's property
rights depended on whether one was faithfully performing one's duties of
loyalty to others. A peasant laboring, let us say, in the depths of the tenth
century, was allotted a certain landholding, provided he faithfully
performed the duties he owed to his lord and his community. The lord, for
his part, also held land on condition that he perform his duties to society,
to his vassals, and to his own lord. All rights in land depended on the
faithful performance of personal obligations to some other persons.
(Conversely, it was understood that persons of a certain social station
would be allotted property accordingly.) Thus no one "owned" land in the
way that we think of things as being directly "owned." Rather, land was
"held" by vassals in return for the performance of services, or the payment
of in-kind rents, to lords.' The relationship between persons and things
was a mediated function of the relationship of loyalty and trust between
persons.
9. This is of course a highly stylized description of feudal society; I would like to acknowledge that
this description is written from a thoroughly legalistic point of view, and is intended to set the stage
for an account of sixteenth-century juristic theories of feudal ordering. Indeed, the description that I
give here corresponds most closely to the assumptions about feudal society to be found in the sixteenth-
century juristic authorities Dumoulin (discussed below, Section II); and C. Loyseau, Traiti du
Ddguerpissement et Delaissement par Hypothaque, in Les Oeuvres de Maistre Charles Loyseau,
nouvelle dd., ed. C. loly (Paris, 1666), separately paginated (orig. 1598), from whom I draw much of
my account. For a much more detailed standard account along much the same lines, extensively
quoting medieval sources, see F. Ganshof, Feudalism, trans. P. Grierson, 3d ed. (New York, 1964). The
account I give fits closely with those to be found in most standard legal, as opposed to social,
histories-see, e.g., P. Ourliac and J. Gazzaniga, Histoire du droit priv6frangais (Paris, 1985), 45-
46-with the exception that I have tried to avoid using the implicitly Roman analytic terms "real" and
"personal" in describing the feudal order as it existed before the revived study of Roman law.
10. The same seems to have been true, mutatis mutandis, of personalty, as reflected in the centrality
of trust in the Germanic rule "Hand wahre Hand." For a brief introduction with references to further
literature, see W. Ogris, "Hand wahre Hand," in A. Erler and E. Kaufmann, eds., Handworterbuch zur
deutschen Rechtsgeschichte (Berlin, 1971), 1: cols. 1928-36.
[Vol. 6: 249
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The contrast with the Roman treatment of property rights was pro-
found.' In dealing with the question of how persons relate to things (a
question, as Paolo Grossi has evocatively said, "soaked in good and
evil,"1 2 a question going to the heart of a legal system's moral grasp of
the world), the ancient Roman legal texts were characterized by a peculiar
kind of absolutism of property rights: Roman jurists tended to present the
relationship between persons and things as direct and unmediated-one's
obligations to other persons had, in principle, no bearing on one's rights in
one's things.' 3 If a Roman person "owned" a thing, the link between
person and thing seemed, to Roman jurists, as direct and unshakeable as the
link between biological mother and child seems to us. An owner's link to
his thing (at least as medieval lawyers understood their private law texts14)
was unaffected by the state of the rest of the society, much as a modem
mother's link to her child is unaffected by the state of the rest of society.
To be sure, the Roman legal texts developed many exceptions to the
enforceability of this property absolutism, just as our law has developed
exceptions to the principle that a biological mother may always claim her
child. But the underlying view of the world, in which persons had absolute
and direct links to their things, remained. In this sense, the Roman relation
between persons and things, as medieval jurists found it in their texts, was
an unmediated relationship.
Of these two elementary conceptions of the relationship between persons
and things, the feudal conception dominated in the society that learned
jurists saw about them in the later Middle Ages and early modem period.
11. For the contrast between the romanist understanding of property and the prevailing medieval
understanding, see P. Grossi, "La proprietA e le proprietA nell'officina dello storico," in E. Cortese, ed.,
La Propriettd e le Propriet (Milan, 1988), 214-15; and H. Honsell, T. Mayer-Maly & W. Selb,
Romisches Recht, 4th ed. (Berlin, 1987), 142-43; K. Kroeschell, "Zur Lehre vom 'germanischen
Eigentumsbegriff,"' in Rechtshistorische Studien. Hans Thieme zum 70. Geburtstag zugeeignet (Cologne,
1977), 34-37.
12. Grossi, "La proprieth e le proprietr," 212.
13. For more thorough general accounts, see especially still F. Schulz, Principles of Roman Law
(Oxford, 1936), 151ff.; as always, Schulz is highly sensitive to premodem debates. See also K.
Kroeschell, "Zur Lehre vom 'germanischen Eigentumsbegriff."' For the classic older view, with a now
generally rejected insistence on the unrestricted character of Roman property rights, see G. Dahm,
Deutsches Recht, 2d ed. (1963), 450ff. For modem objections to this account, see Honsell, Mayer-Maly
& Selb, Romisches Recht, 142-43. I do not wish to deny the truth of what authors like Honsell et al.
say with regard to ancient law. My purpose here is simply to describe a medieval and early modem
problematic.
14. Cf. Schulz, Principles of Roman Law, 152-53: "Duties ... may be associated with Roman
ownership-the aversion to duties so often emphatically stated to be a part of Roman ownership is
simply non-existent. The duties, however-apart from those towards neighbours-are seldom or never
mentioned, as they come under public law, this being strictly separated from private law, which was
the Roman lawyers' main concern." See also Schulz's accompanying footnote, 153 n. 1. The critical
fact, then, is not that Roman law was in fact characterized by property absolutism, in the sense I am
using it here, in antiquity, but that Roman law as described in the private law texts with which
medieval jurists were familiar, was characterized in that way. It is a peculiar feature of Roman private
law that it omitted express regulation of many social restrictions which would have limited property
rights as they limited other sorts of legal rights.
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To be sure, feudal society in anything like its classic form had vanished
after the central Middle Ages. As Marc Bloch long ago argued, classic
feudalism was associated with a "shortage of currency"; 5 classic feudal
society was a society based on trust at least in part because it was a society
that lacked money; a decline had to set in as soon as money began to
circulate widely in the central Middle Ages. The later medieval world
became a world in which lords often collected money payments from
vassals, especially in the form of land rents, or what was called the "cens,"
a regular tax-like payment. This monetized order was different enough
from the classical feudal order that it is now usually given the separate
name "seigneurialism." But despite this heavy monetization, basic feudal
assumptions remained, in custom, the law: most property rights remained
theoretically feudal, theoretically "held" in return for the performance of
personal services-even when those services had in fact been commuted
into money payments.
When late medieval and early modem jurists trained in Roman law tried
to analyze European property relations, they were thus confronted by rights
that violated the root concepts of their texts. On the one hand, lawyers had
to recognize that feudal rights were at least in part Roman law "real" rights.
Especially after the disasters of the Black Plague and the Hundred Years'
War, there was a fairly lively traffic in feudal real properties. 16 But at the
same time, the jurists had to recognize that once these real properties
changed hands, a vassal-lord relationship was created, with a host of
personal obligations. The purchaser-typically the vassal-had to pay
rents, and also, often, to perform personal services. Both parties had a
general feudal duty of mutual trust and loyalty. No one had rights in the
piece of property in question unless those personal duties were observed
and personal obligations performed.
How then could one use Roman texts to analyze feudal relations? To
some extent, the problem could be solved by means of the famous doctrine
of split property, developed by the marvelous Roman jurists of medieval
Italy, which held that both seigneur and vassal counted somehow as
"owner."' 7  But it is a mistake to suppose that the doctrine of split
property solved all problems. Simply declaring both parties to be part-
"owner" did not settle the questions of the greatest financial and social
weight: the questions about how and when one party had to make payments
to the other. To settle those questions, jurists had to look deeper and
harder at their Roman sources. Struggling with their sources, medieval
15. M. Bloch, Feudal Society, trans. L.A. Manyon (Chicago, 1961), 66ff.
16. H. Neveux, "Dclin et reprise, la fluctuation bis.culaire," in G. Duby and A. Wallon, eds.,
Histoire de la France Rurale (n.p., 1975), 2:41ff.
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jurists managed to develop two quite different approaches, one a "real"
approach and one a "personal" approach."8 Neither was truly satisfactory,
but both would linger, in European jurisprudence, down into the time of the
great Revolutions.
When medieval jurists tried to think of feudal rights as essentially "real,"
they analyzed a feudal lord's rights using the familiar Roman concept of
"servitudes." Roman "servitudes" were strictly limited rights to use
someone else's property-prototypically, a right of way to cross someone
else's property. A Roman who had such a right of way did not own the
property that he was entitled to cross. Nevertheless, he did have a limited
"real" right in that property. The right to demand feudal payments and
services could be analyzed as that sort of limited "real" right. When a lord
demanded his payments and services, he was acting essentially in the way
the holder of a right of way acts: he was, as it were, striding across the
feudal property; he was enjoying rights that attached to the piece of
property and not to the vassal who happened to possess it.'9
This servitude analogy was in its way quite ingenious. But (as Renais-
sance jurists would later complain 20 ) it made little sense as Roman law.2'
Feudal rights clearly imposed upon the vassal a personal obligation to act,
whereas Roman texts established equally clearly that servitudes created real
rights and could not possibly impose personal obligations. True Roman
servitudes were to be passively "suffered." One had one's right to stride
across the property, but one could demand no positive acts from the owner.
Yet a feudal vassal had the active, personal obligation to gather money or
in-kind rents with his own hands, and bring those rents to his lord.
Servitude analysis was, however, not the only alternative. Medieval
jurists also tried to analyze feudal rights as essentially "personal" in nature.
Lawyers who took this yet more ingenious approach viewed feudal rights
as a kind of mortgage relationship. According to this analysis, the vassal
was a "debtor," the lord was a "creditor," and the debt between them was
"secured" by the infeudated property. It was as though there had been a
fictitious loan of money from lord to vassal at some point, secured by the
vassal's property. The vassal's payments were mortgage payments, and the
18. Gierke, Deutsches Privatrecht, 2:704-05, emphasizes, in my view correctly, that these are two
alternative approaches. Current French legal historical literature, by contrast, does not generally treat
these two forms of analysis together, as conceptual alternatives. Sixteenth-century scholars were clearer
on this point. See still Loyseau, Traits du Deguerpissement, I, 3, pp. 6ff. for a penetrating discussion
of these alternatives.
19. See now P. Grossi, "'Dominia' e 'Servitutes,"' in Grossi, 11 Dominio e le Cose. Percezioni
Medievali e Moderne dei Diritti Reali, Quaderni Fiorentini Per la Storia del Pensiero Giuridico Moderno
41 (Milan, 1992), 57-122.
20. Loyseau, Traid, I, 3, 10, p. 8 and generally pp. 7-8.
21. For the generally accepted critique of this conceptualization, see F. Schulz, Classical Roman
Law (Oxford, 1951), 384, again sensitive to premodern debates.
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lord's rights-particularly his right to reenter the property-could be
analyzed as a Roman creditor's rights.22
This sort of conceptualization had its virtues. In particular, the "creditor"
analogy had one very great practical advantage from the point of view of
seigneurs: it greatly enhanced the liability of vassals. For under the
"creditor" analogy, the vassal had personal liability, and in principle could
remain personally obligated even if the underlying property were de-
stroyed.23 Nor was the destruction of the underlying property a purely
conjectural possibility: war, and great disasters like phylloxera, often
effectively destroyed properties in the premodern world, and it was very
much in the interest of seigneurs to be able to pursue their vassals even
after these all-too-common events had taken place.24
But appealing as the "creditor" conceptualization might seem, it had
grave difficulties, just as the "servitude" conceptualization did. Use of the
"creditor" analogy raised uncomfortable questions about whether the
seigneur's rights were usurious. For canon lawyers, the idea that a feudal
relationship should be analyzed as a debtor-creditor relationship smacked
of all the worst features of usury, for it meant that a two-sided obligation
of loyalty would be transformed into a one-sided obligation of liability, and
until very late in the Middle Ages, canon lawyers cast a cold eye on the
"creditor" analogy. 25  Moreover, as Roman law, mortgage analysis was
quite as erroneous as was servitude analysis. As a Renaissance critic would
object: "The mortgage is a subsidiary or accessory obligation of the thing,
which serves to confirm and assure the promise of the person who is the
debtor; but the feudal obligation is a payment due properly and directly
22. See the discussion of Gierke, Deutsches Privatrecht, 2:704-05, and references cited therein.
23. This, it is important to say, did not involve simply the mortgage analogy, which in principle
could limit the obligation only to the underlying property, but the fuller "creditor" analogy, which
permitted the imposition of a wide range of personal liability through the creation of "general"
mortgages and special liability clauses. For the techniques involved, see B. Schnapper, Les Rentes au
XVIe Sikcle. Histoire d'un instrument de crddit (Paris, 1957), 57ff.
24. Two sources indicate that the liability of the vassal in the event of the destruction of the
property was one, or the, critical factor. First, standard treatments all discuss wartime destruction,
which was clearly the principal context. This is true of the German literature discussed below at note
89. A list of authorities is provided, for example, in [J.] Renauldon, Dictionnaire des Fiefs et des
Droits Seigneuriaux Utiles et Honorifiques (Paris, 1765), 138. It is also true of Loyseau, whose Traits
du Deguerpissement was a commentary on the status of Paris homeowners who were obliged to pay
their rents despite the destruction of their homes in the course of the French Wars of Religion. See the
full title of the first edition of Loyseau's work, which is presented as a commentary on a royal
ordinance dealing with that problem. Loyseau omitted the subtitle that referred to the context in which
he wrote from the third edition on; it is deleted by Loyseau's own hand in the copy of the second
edition in the Bibliotbque Nationale, Paris, shelf number F. 20459, which seems to have served as his
copy for corrections. The second reason for believing that liability was the key issue is the fact that
Roman law analysis dovetailed here with the canon law analysis discussed extensively by Schnapper,
Les Rentes. See below, note 30.
25. J.T. Noonan, The Scholastic Analysis of Usury (Cambridge, Mass., 1957), 154-70; B.
Schnapper, "Les rentes chez les thologiens et les canonistes du XIIle au XVIe si~cle," in ttudes
d'histoire de Droit Canonique didides a1 Gabriel le Bras (Paris, 1965), 2:965-95.
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from the piece of property, and not from the person. ''26 Creditor analysis
erred much too far in the direction of calling feudal rights "personal" rights,
neglecting their "real" aspect.
Thus both prevailing forms of analysis-servitude and creditor-were
wrong as Roman law. But it was difficult to do better. Lawyers who
wished to apply Roman law had to make do with the choice between two
dubious Roman law analogies: the "personal" creditor analogy or the "real"
servitude analogy.
II
The history of medieval struggles with Roman law analysis forms the
ultimate historical background to the 1790 work of the Committee on
Feudal Rights. Faced with the uncomfortable choice between two
unsatisfactory medieval analogies, French legal practice, at the end of
Middle Ages, showed a strong tendency to favor the creditor analogy. By
around the year 1500, the idea had strongly established itself in French
practice that the seigneur should generally be thought of as a kind of
"creditor" with mortgage rights. The creditor analogy was directly written
into the basic texts of French law, the so-called "Customs" of France,
compiled as sources of French customary law through a complex and
politicized procedure during roughly the first two-thirds of the sixteenth
century. The Customs frequently declared "seigneurs" to have the rights
of "creditors," embracing the Roman "personal" analogy in very full
measure.
27
Why did French practice, in the form of the Customs, embrace the
"creditor" analogy? While the answer is not entirely clear, I think we can
speak with some confidence. By embracing the "creditor" analogy, the
Customs satisfied two different, powerful constituencies: learned lawyers,
and local seigneurs. The Customs were redacted by jurists who had been
schooled in the great traditions of medieval Roman law analysis 28 and
who could be expected to seek some Roman law analysis. The Customs
were, furthermore, written under pressure from seigneurial interests.
29
From the point of view of seigneurs, the "creditor" analogy had a very
26. Loyseau, TraitS, I, 3, 11, p. 8.
27. Gierke, Deutsches Privatrecht, 705 n. 16; R. Filhol, Le Premier Prisident Christofle de Thou
et la Rformation des Coutumes (Paris, 1937), 252. The French customs are reviewed in A. Loisel,
Institutes Coutumires, ed. Dupin and Laboulaye (Paris, 1846), Liv. IV, Tits. 1-2, pp. 8-26.
28. Ourliac and Gazzaniga, Histoire, 150 and 378-79 n. 2, summarize the conclusions of the
monographic literature.
29. See, e.g., Piano Mortari, Diritto Romano, 87; and the full account of J.P. Dawson, "The
Codification of the French Customs," Michigan Law Review 38 (1940): 765-800. Struggles over this
issue went on in the customary jurisprudence over the course of the century. See the account of Filhol,
Christofle de Thou, 249ff.
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great advantage indeed, for by using the creditor analogy, it was possible
to create extensive personal liability for vassals.30
But if the Customs had already embraced Roman law at the end of the
Middle Ages, granting seigneurs "creditors' rights," why did the Committee
on Feudal Rights have to declare the seigneurs to be creditors three
hundred years later, in 1789? Here we come to the nub of my tale. The
answer is that while the Customs declared the seigneurs to be creditors as
early as 1500, the French legal profession began to raise questions about
that declaration almost from the beginning. As French legal historians have
amply shown, sixteenth-century lawyers-moved by the great purist
movements of humanism and religious reform-experienced intellectual and
spiritual doubts almost as soon as the Customs had experienced their initial
redaction in the first years of the sixteenth century. A desire to "reform"
the Customs governed much of French jurists' activity throughout the
sixteenth century,3' and it governed their approach to the seigneur-creditor
question as well. Thoughtful lawyers simply could not accept the
30. See the full discussion of techniques at the beginning of the century in the context of customary
jurisprudence in Filhol, Christofle de Thou, 252; as well as Schnapper, Les Rentes, 57ff. The "creditor"
analogy was possibly attractive to lawyers for another reason as well: because of canon law traditions.
Medieval canon lawyers worked along lines that converged with those of the Roman lawyers. Where
Roman lawyers tended to assimilate "seigneurs" to the class of "creditors," canon lawyers, driven by
concerns about usury, tended to assimilate "creditors" to the class of "seigneurs."
Here the background fact was a pattern of rural lending, dating far back into the Middle Ages. It was
inevitable that the monetized "seigneurial" order would have a heavy element of credit transactions.
Well back into the Middle Ages, "creditors" were accordingly lending money in transactions that made
them difficult to distinguish from "seigneurs." Money, in these transactions, was extended in return for
"seigneurial" payments. Practically speaking, there was little means of distinguishing such transactions
from ordinary seigneurial transactions. By the late Middle Ages, this form of seigneurialized lending
had taken the regular form of the creation of land annuities, later to be called "rentes constitures." In
the creation of such a "rente constiture," the lender would acquire the right to a regular stream of rents
from the debtor's land. The land, in effect, would secure the loan.
By the fifteenth century, the Canonists had arrived at a decision critical to the tale I tell here: they
held that these "rentes constitutes" were legitimate as long as they were structured to meet certain
requirements. Their interest rate had to be limited; the "seller"-debtor had to have the right to
repurchase the annuity, buying his way out of the transaction. Otherwise, they were to be structured
as ordinary feudal land purchases, with their payments treated like ordinary feudal prestations. For all
this, see generally the account of Schnapper, Les Rentes, 49-78.
This canon ruling has interested chiefly economic historians, who have seen it as critical to the rise
of a functioning credit economy. But we should recognize that it had grave social as well as economic
consequences-social consequences for the ability of lawyers to distinguish seigneurs from creditors.
In effect, the canon lawyers had allowed lending as long as that lending conformed to the social norms
of the countryside: as long, that is, as creditors "bought" in ways that made them essentially indistin-
guishable, for most purposes, from seigneurs. On paper, there was no easy way to distinguish these
two sorts of rents, and it was (and would remain throughout the early modem period) difficult or
impossible to tell a "rente constiture" from a "rente fonci~re." For a very learned account of the
difficulties, see Henrion de Pansey, Trait, des Fiefs de Dumoulin, Analyst et Confdr6 avec les autres
Feudistes (Paris, 1773), 200ff; for the continuing difficulty "Uber die Revolution und die napoleonische
Herrschaft hinaus," see Van den Heuvel, "Fodalitr, Frodal," 39. This practically existing confusion
of the two types of "rente" was surely an additional factor, alongside liability, inclining French jurists
to use the "creditor" analogy. This was in part simply a matter of law-office utility: since there was
often no means of distinguishing the rights of "creditors" from the rights of "seigneurs" anyway, the
temptation to declare the two classes to be the same for legal purposes must have been powerful.
31. See the classic account in Filhol, Christofle de Thou.
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identification of seigneurs with creditors, and they set themselves to work
reinterpreting the Customs.
The work of reinterpretation was bound up, at least at the beginning,
with the social ideas of the Reformation. In particular, it was bound up
with one of the most interesting and elusive figures of Reformation legal
thought, Charles Dumoulin. Dumoulin, born in 1500, was a remarkably
brilliant and profoundly influential lawyer. Like so many of the great
French, English, and German lawyers of the sixteenth century, he had
deeply Protestant sympathies; like most of these lawyers, Protestantism
meant, for him, the resurrection of a lost Christian-feudal order, founded
at least in part on the politico-religious leadership of a resurrected Christian
nobility. He was, in fact, as many scholars have observed, the founder of
a tradition of Ancient Constitutionalism that would spread from France
throughout Europe,32 and it was in the service of the revival of the ancient
Christian-feudal constitution that he approached the problem of "seigneurs"
and "creditors."
When Dumoulin, this great Reformation lawyer, addressed himself to the
problem of distinguishing "seigneurs" from "creditors," he was drawing on
central ideas of the political theology of the Reform. Luther himself had
deplored the tendency to confuse "seigneurs" with "creditors," and had
done so in one of his most important writings: his Address to the Christian
Nobility of the German Nation of 1520. That famous work was directed
to the religious consciences of a Christian seigneurial leadership. It was
undoubtedly in part because he needed this leadership, that Luther,
surveying the evils of Germany, poured particular scorn on the tendency to
call "creditors" "seigneurs." Roman (and canon33) analysis had contribut-
ed to a great confusion of "seigneurs" and "creditors" in Germany as in
France. This confusion Luther saw as nothing less than "the greatest
misfortune of the German nation"-"a figure and sign that the world has
been sold to the devil for the hard dollar. '34 For Luther, the confusion of
"seigneurs" and "creditors" was a symptom of a terrible corruption in the
Christian-feudal order.
32. On Dumoulin, see J.-L. Thireau, Charles Du Moulin (1500-1566): Etudes sur les sources, la
methode, les iddes politiques et dconomiques d'un juriste de la Renaissance (Geneva, 1980). For his
connection to the larger constitutionalist tradition, see D. Kelley, "Civil Science in the Renaissance:
Jurisprudence in the French Manner," History of European Ideas 2 (1981): 269; P. Craveri, Ricerche
sulla Formazione del Diritto Consuetudinario in Francia (Milan, 1969), 198.
33. Luther was, I should rush to state, addressing himself to the canon analysis described above.
To quote him more fully: "[Dias grossist ungluck deutscher Nation ist gewiszlich der zynzs kauff." M.
Luther, An den christlichen Adel deutscher Nation (1520), in WA 6:466. For the meaning of
"zinskauff," cf. Grimm Wiirterbuch s.v., vol. 31, col. 1527. For an invocation of this passage by a later
German jurist concerned with "rentes constitutes," see lohan-Otto Tabor, De Praesidiis Debitorum
Egentium (Strasbourg: J. Andrea, 1646), 13r. Again, I must insist on the tremendous importance of the
parallelism between canon and Roman analysis.
34. Luther, An den christlichen Adel deutscher Nation, 466.
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What worried Luther was also what worried Dumoulin, eighteen years
later. Luther's heated rhetoric was, however, very different from
Dumoulin's sort of sober legal and constitutional analysis. Where Luther
fulminated, Dumoulin was obliged to do something much more difficult:
Dumoulin was obliged to craft legal arguments that would translate his
vision of the ancient feudal constitution into rules for day-to-day seigneurial
practice. He needed legal reasoning that would defeat or blunt the
"creditor" analogy that was written into the French Customs, and so
preserve the feudal social order.
Dumoulin undertook this very difficult task in his famous first work, his
Commentary on the Custom of Paris, which he published in 1538. The
Custom of Paris was the preeminent Custom of France, widely used even
outside of Paris as a supplemental body of law. It treated two principal
types of Parisian tenures: "fiefs," the so-called noble tenures, which carried
a right of homage; and "censives," the non-noble tenures, which carried the
right to a tax-like payment called the cens.35 With respect to both sorts
of holding, the Custom presented Dumoulin with uncomfortable language:
both fief-seigneurs and censive-seigneurs were characterized as creditors.
Dumoulin had no choice but to accept these characterizations: it was the
law that both fief-seigneurs and censive-seigneurs were, for important
purposes, to be thought of as "creditors." Nevertheless, it is clear that the
law from which he earned his bread brought him spiritual unease, and that
he wished to find some means of legal reasoning that would undercut the
"creditor" analogy without directly flouting it. This was a problem that he
approached differently in dealing with the two different types of Parisian
tenures. With regard to fiefs, Dumoulin mounted a number of complex and
beautifully wrought arguments to show that the relationship between lord
and vassal was not an economic relationship (as medieval Canonists had
implied), but a more purely feudal relationship of "honor and grace."36
35. Despite the fact that the censive was a non-noble tenure, the holder still had seigneurial rights.
See, e.g., Olivier-Martin, Histoire du droit fran~ais, 266-67. This tenure was perhaps particularly
important because it threatened most to slip out of the feudal order and into a more purely commercial
world.
36. Dumoulin's argument, with regard to fiefs, is of great beauty and deserves to be described in
some detail. After denying, against some humanist authority, that the feudal relation had any direct
genetic connection with Roman institutions, but praising the Romans as a moral model, Dumoulin
turned to the canon authority that held that seigneurs were not usurers, because, even though they
extended credit, they extended that credit "graciously and out of liberality." Dumoulin made short work
of this specious argument:
nec etiam videtur obstare quod huiusmodi admissio in fidem est gratiosa & liberalis: & sic potest
patronus quam vult legem & modum apponere, ut diximus. supra eo. glo. 2. nu. 1. quia verum est
de modo & pacto licito, non de illicito, ut usurario: imo hoc esset abominabilius et nephandius inter
patronum & clientum quam inter extraneos ....
C. Dumoulin, Commentarius in Priores Titulos antiquae consuetudinis Parisiensis, in Caroli Molinaei,
Omnia quae extant Opera, ed. novissima (Paris, 1681) 1:115, Tit. 1, § 1, gl. 9, no. 14. Usury was a
moral wrong, even as against aliens, one which no degree of "graciousness and liberality" could wash
white. How much more "abominable and unspeakable," then, as between "patron and client." A very
finely wrought socio-moral argument lay behind this passage, one which legal philosophers can still
[Vol. 6: 249
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His treatment of fiefs, however, was not nearly as important for French
legal history as his treatment of censives. Censives were the more
important of the two; over the course of the ancien rigime, they were to
become the "normal form" of real property-holding in France.37 It was
particularly with regard to censives that Dumoulin set the pattern of
distinguishing seigneurs from creditors that would dominate in French
juristic thought up until the Revolution-the pattern of guaranteeing
seigneurs the personal right to a "show of honor and respect."
Censives were properties whose lords were entitled to a regular tax-like
payment, the "cens," from their vassal-debtors. How was one to character-
ize this relationship as anything other than a debtor-creditor relationship?
In searching for answers, Dumoulin lit upon a seemingly insignificant gap
in the provisions of the Custom regarding payment. The Custom did not
state who had the obligation to deliver feudal payments: it did not say
whether the lord-creditor had to fetch his payment from his vassal-debtor,
or whether the vassal-debtor had to bring payment to his lord. The
question of the delivery of payment may seem a trivial omission; certainly
it is the sort of omission that would rarely interest historians doing purely
economic analysis. But there is more to human relations than cost, and it
was upon this omission that the shrewd Christian lawyer Dumoulin sought
to build a social system of honor and respect.
Dumoulin's issue had been briefly addressed by the great fourteenth-
century Bolognese authority, Baldus, who had arrived at the following
distinction between ordinary debts and seigneurial "debts":
The general question is posed, whether the debtor should be required
to go to the place of the creditor, or vice versa. I respond by making
a distinction: If the debt is one which involves a measure of obsequi-
ousness, or the showing of respect, then the debtor is obliged to come
to the creditor, just as vassals are required to do when they renew their
vows of loyalty. Cens-payers are required to act in this way, as are
study with profit. The abstract concept of "graciousness and liberality," Dumoulin in effect argued, was
useless outside the context of the moral analysis of social relations. The social relation in question was
that of "patron and client," of seigneur and vassal seen through the lens of Roman tradition. How then
was the status of seigneurs as creditors, unshakeably sanctioned in the Custom of Paris and the
traditions of medieval law, to be justified? Here is Dumoulin's solution:
[R]es de qua patronus investit clientem, affert fructum & reditum, & omnis ille reditus, jure optimo
debetur, & spectat ad patronum ... itaque si clientem admittit in fidem juribus non solutis, multum
honoris & gratiae ei facit ...
Dumoulin, Commentarius, 1:116, Tit. I, § 1, gl. 9, no. 19. From a purely abstract point of view, this
giving of Dumoulinian "honor and grace" was of course indistinguishable from the giving of canon
"graciousness and liberality." Insisting on the social context in this way made no legal difference; in
the end, Dumoulin simply accepted medieval legal strictures. But it made a socio-moral difference. For
Dumoulin had accepted the old legal strictures on new grounds; grounds that allowed him to preach;
grounds that allowed him to emphasize all that was "abominable and unspeakable" in the moral decay
of the seigneurial relationship in a world of debtors and creditors.
37. P. Ourliac and J. de Malafosse, Droit Romain et Ancien Droit (Paris, 1961), 2:155.
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the payers of in-kind rents, since they stand in a relationship of a
certain kind of subjection.38
Baldus thus held that feudal and seigneurial creditors, unlike ordinary
creditors, were entitled to demand that their "debtors" bring them payment.
And they were entitled to make this demand, because it was in the nature
of the feudal-seigneurial relationship that debtors were bound to show "a
bit of obsequiousness," were bound to show "respect." Ordinary creditors,
by contrast, had to arrange a place of payment contractually, or else show
up at the door of their debtor, where they could demand only payment,
never respect.
Dumoulin seized energetically on Baldus's suggestion, with its little
social drama of obsequiousness and respect. The Custom of Paris itself
said not a word establishing that the vassal was required to bring his
payment to his seigneur. But Dumoulin saw a need, and he made it clear
that an enforced visit by vassal to lord was necessary in order to integrate
censives into the larger system of rural honor. Forcing the cens-payer to
"show respect" at the residence of his seigneur was a means of maintaining
the feudal character of the censive. Dumoulin writes here in what would
become one of the most cited passages of ancien rigime law:
Cens-payers and vassals are obliged to come to their lord, and indeed
to his home, whether to make payments or to renew their investiture.
For this is not a mere pecuniary debt. It has attached to it the
showing of honor and respect, as Baldus beautifully puts it. The same
is not true of ordinary payments.39
Behind the pallid legal language of this once-famous passage shimmers the
vivid image of a whole rural social order. It is Dumoulin's desire to
transform the cens-payer's payment into a ceremony as full of meaning as
the investiture with a fief. Accordingly, he insists that the cens be, as later
French terminology would put it, "portable" and not "qu6rable": he insists
that the cens be brought by the vassal to the lord, not sought by the lord
from the vassal.
So much was essentially no more than what Baldus had suggested. But
Dumoulin also went yet further than Baldus had gone: he also focused on
the precise nature of the cens itself, in ways that would prove extremely
influential. What was this cens?, Dumoulin asked. It could not be "a mere
money debt," for the payment of the cens was to be an occasion, not for
the settling of mere financial accounts, but for the "showing of honor and
respect." Accordingly, "cens" was to be understood as a term for "modest
38. Baldi Ubaldi Perusini, In Sextum Codicis Librum Commentaria (Venetiis, 1577), ad Tit. De
cond. insert. I. 4, p. 167v.
39. Dumoulin, "Secunda Pars Commentatorium Analyticorum in Consuetudines Parisienses," in
Opera Omnia, 1:815, § 85, no. 3.
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annual payment, which is made in recognition of lordship rights." 4° The
critical word, in this definition, was "modest": the cens had, by Dumoulini-
an definition, to be a small payment. Characterizing the cens in this way
required Dumoulin to reject much authority.4' But he found it important
to insist that this was not a payment made because it had any value. It was
a symbolic non-value payment.42
The idea that the cens should have little value was quite central to
Dumoulin's vision, one in which I think we should see an important kind
of Reformation symbolism. The full scope of Dumoulin's idea, elaborated
from Baldus, was that the cens-payer should be obliged to make an annual
trip to the residence of his seigneur, carrying a symbolically negligible
cens, in order to show "honor and respect." At the center of this annual
ceremony solemnizing a nonfinancial relationship was to be a payment that
was no payment at all. The result was a resonant transmutation of the
payment relationship, on its face so purely economic. Dumoulin's payment
of the cens served, so to speak, as a kind of financial black mass-a
payment whose very design was to deny its own nature as payment. With
this, Dumoulin had created a symbolically noncommercial ceremony that
would prove to be of great importance from the early seventeenth century
on.
But before pressing on to Dumoulin's later influence, I would like to
linger for a moment over his work as a work of legal reasoning. In a
sense, Dumoulin had only done what Continental legal theorists and
historians say that lawyers always do: he had filled a gap. The Custom of
Paris said nothing about whether vassal must go to lord or vice versa. We
should notice, however, that he had filled his gap not through an appeal to
Roman law, nor through an appeal to custom in any narrow sense, but
through the invocation of a fairly grand and deeply reasoned vision of
society; his appeal was not to particular provisions of customary law but
to a large social tradition. We should also notice how ultimately inaccurate
it is to say that Dumoulin "filled" his gap. He did not "fill" a gap in the
law of debtor-creditor relations; he used a gap to undercut the law of
debtor-creditor relations.
At any rate, with this piece of legal reasoning Dumoulin had created a
mark by which the "seigneurs" could be kept separate from mere
40. Ibid., 1:671, § 73, no. 20. For the medieval background, see Schnapper, Les rentes, 41.
41. Dumoulin, "Secunda Pars," 1:669, § 73, no. 7 and ff.
42. It was probably possible for Dumoulin to insist that the cens should always be small because
the great inflation from the late Middle Ages onward, and especially in the sixteenth century, vastly
reduced the value of all money payments. See, e.g., Olivier-Martin, Histoire du Droit Fran~ais, 647-48.
In effect Dumoulin was holding that the face value of the cens, unlike the face value of other dues,
could not be adjusted upwards.
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"creditors." A kind of ritualized feudalism would continue to ex-
ist-haunting, so to speak, the interstices of the debtor-creditor order.43
III
Dumoulin was not the only jurist to address the great Reformation
concern about distinguishing seigneurs from creditors. We should place
alongside him, at a minimum, the great Loyseau, whose Traitg du
Diguerpissement spoke, at the end of the French Wars of Religion, to
exactly the same constellation of "seigneur"/"creditor" difficulties that
Dumoulin had faced." There are other issues, too, that a complete
account of this history would touch upon.
45
Yet Dumoulin, the calm lawyerly Christian, remained supremely
important, setting what would remain the basic terms of debate for the next
two and a half centuries;46 and Dumoulin's minor ritual of the cens-al-
ways portable, always to be brought by the vassal to his lord-would
remain at the center of the French Roman legal tradition down to the
Revolution. According to the basic terms of the Dumoulinian tradition,
seigneurs retained, with regard to most payments and rights, the enforce-
ment rights of creditors which had been vouchsafed them by the French
Customs. 47  Nevertheless, those seigneurs were something significantly
more than mere creditors; 48 as the cens ritual dramatized, they belonged
to a feudal order of "honor and respect."
Dumoulin's cens remained centrally important indeed, as the great
symbol of what French society was not. The cens seems to have
43. Dumoulin, I would thus emphasize, was neither "for" the monarchy nor "for" any particular
class, but for a feudal order that established rights and duties on all.
44. See note 36.
45. In particular, the creation of a tacit general mortgage on behalf of the seigneur meant havoc for
land markets, since these "mortgage" interests were unrecorded. For this "crance priviligife," see, e.g,.
Ddnisart, Collection des Dkcisions Nouvelles, 317; Renauldon, Dictionnaire, 140; [M. de la Touloubre],
Collection de Jurisprudence sur les Matidres F~odales et les Droits Seigneuriaux, nouv. dd. (Avignon,
1773), 1:12-13; 2:69. Repeated royal attempts to develop some sort of recordation practice (beginning
already in the sixteenth century!) were defeated by the opposition of landed seigneurs. See A. Franken,
Das Franzosische Pfandrecht im Mittelalter (1879; reprint, Aalen, 1969), 20-23; and J. Minier, Prcis
historique du droitfranfais. Introduction a l'6tude du droit (Paris, 1854), 553, 637-38. Seigneurs were
not only creditors, but also debtors; and a full history of credit and honor in France would have to
discuss this seigneurial resistance to subjection to normal debtor/creditor rules.
It should also be noted that seigneurs were not the only holders of such "tacit" mortgages. Other
parties with a claim to protection under customary law, particularly wives and other dependents, were
also protected under Romanizing analysis through "tacit" mortgages of various types, created both by
statute and common law. For a wide-ranging, if strangely rambling, account of the remarkable variety
of creditors' rights and debtors' protections (including such items as lawyers' books and priests'
vestments), along with a full discussion of forms and procedures, see Antoine Bruneau, Nouveau Traitd
des Crides, Contenant les Procedures, pour faire Toutes Sortes de Decrets, Suivant les Coutumes,
Ordonnances, Arrests & Reglemens, sur ce intervenus jusques b present, 3d ed. (Paris, 1704). "Tacit"
mortgages were an important means of denaturing debtor/creditor law.
46. For Dumoulin's importance in the eighteenth century, see, e.g., Robin "Fief et Seigneurie," 465.
47. See, e.g., Ddnisart, Collection des Ddcisions Nouvelles, 316-17.
48. In part, this was because they had extra creditors' rights. See note 45.
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dominated in litigation, 49 and it dominated in the juristic literature, too.
Long after the storms of the Reformation had passed, French jurists
continued to follow Dumoulin's authority. Long after the Reformation, the
cens, and the question of its portabilitg, remained perhaps the most
controverted question of prerevolutionary rural France.5"
It was a controverted question because, while jurists generally wished to
put Dumoulin into effect, putting Dumoulin into effect was a difficult, and
in part a juristically dubious, enterprise. In theory, the question of
portabiliti should have been resolved by customary law. There was,
however, not enough customary law to settle the question. Some Customs
were interpreted as specifying that the cens was portable-that it had to be
brought, as Dumoulin would wish, by the vassal to the seigneur.5 But
many Customs (including, as we have seen, the centrally important Custom
of Paris) said nothing on this question, and many were interpreted as
specifying that it was quirable-that the seigneur, contrary to Dumoulinian
theory, had to come fetch it from the vassal.52 Eventually, in this French
world of variegated custom, Dumoulin's approach won out, and by the late
eighteenth century it won out with a radicalism possible only in French
legal culture: it was extended, in principle, even to properties where by
custom there was no cens whatsoever.
But this victory came only slowly. The mildest form of Dumoulinianism
would have been the establishment of the principle that where Customs
were silent, it should be implied that the cens was portable. Even this mild
form was still too radical for the Paris Parlement in 1627, which in that
year decided what may have been the first major test of Dumoulin's theory.
The peasants of Feugerolles, who lived five or eight miles from their
seigneur's chateau, contested their seigneur's claim that their cens was
portable. Claude Henrys, who reported the case, described what was at
stake in the ritual of the portable cens:
49. As Dr. Schmale has shown, in the sixteenth century, the cens accounted for from a quarter to
a half of cases between peasants and seigneurs at the Parlement of Paris; in the seventeenth century,
from fifty-five to seventy percent; and in the eighteenth century, as much as eighty percent of cases
involved the cens. Calculated according to various methods in Schmale, Bauerlicher Widerstand, 135-
36, 153.
50. The heat of this controversy is noted by J. Bastier, La Fiodalit, au Sicle des Lumires dans
la Rggion de Toulouse (1730-1790) (Paris, 1975); and (rather indirectly) by Schmale, see Bauerlicher
Widerstand. Neither author brings out, I think, the deeper importance of this controversy in ancien
rdgime legal thought.
51. E.g., Custom of Anjou of 1508, § 178, in Nouveau Coutumier General, ed. T. Chauvelin, J.
Brodeau & J. Ricard (Paris, 1724), 4:546; Custom of Maine, n.d., § 196, in Nouveau Coutumier
General, 4:482.
52. For examples, see Custom of Melun of 1506, § 132, in Nouveau Coutumier General, 3:421-22;
Custom of the Grand Perche of 1558, § 83, in Nouveau Coutumier General, 3:652; Custom of Blois
of 1523, §§ 109, 113-15, in Nouveau Coutumier General, 3:1055; Custom of Orlans of 1509, §§ 117,
119, in Nouveau Coutumier General, 3:743. For a late survey of the variety of Customs by a very
interesting, subversively minded author, see M.D.P.D.C. [Honord Lacombe de Prezel], Dictionnaire
Portatifde Jurisprudence et de Pratique, d l'usage de tous les Citoyens & principalement de ceux qui
se destinent au Barreau (Paris, 1763), 1:223.
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The portable cens ... is demanding and vexatious, and vassals
struggle to free themselves from this obligation. On the other side, the
seigneurs exert their energies to bind the vassals, since beyond the
advantages that they draw when the cens is brought to them, it is a
great mark of their domination [grande marque de seigneurie].53
How to resolve this conflict of interests in honor? Henrys was strongly
inclined to follow Dumoulin, holding that at least where the custom was
silent, the principle of "honor and respect" dictated that the cens be
portable unless the local Custom stated otherwise.-4 The Parlement,
however, avoided reaching any such large questions of the nature of respect
and its enforcement. Instead, the Parlement held, as a matter of statutory
construction, that a few rather ambiguous terms in the local Custom could
be interpreted as making the local cens portable.55
But a half century later, there was much more room for Dumoulinian
radicalism. Sixteen eighty-two, in the heat of the legal reforms of Louis
XIV, was the date of a decision that would be cited throughout the
eighteenth century.56  This time, the case involved la Grande Ma-
demoiselle, the powerful magnate, who had moved her southern French
chateau across a border in the Massif Central. Her vassals resisted her
demand that they bring their cens to a residence in a foreign jurisdiction,
but the Parlement held against them. Every cens was always portable;
Customs that seemed to state a rule to the contrary had simply been
misread.57 It was a basic principal of the seigneurial order that vassals
must always present themselves, at cens-paying time, at the residence of
their seigneur in order to "show respect."
That was the watershed. From this 1682 decision on, the jurisprudence
of the cens was marked by the same phenomenon that marked so many
aspects of French intellectual life in the classical period: a clear orthodoxy.
With regard to the cens, the classical clear orthodoxy embraced Dumoulin
and the show of respect as a means of distinguishing seigneurs from mere
creditors. The cens continued to be of disproportionate importance in the
53. Claude Henrys, Recueil d'Arrets Remarquables donnez en la Cour de Parlament de Paris
(Paris: Gervais Alliot, 1638), 163. The case is also discussed in Schmale, Bauerlicher Widerstand, 135.
54. Henrys, Recueil d'Arrets Remarquables, 167-69. The peasants of Feugerolles contended that
they were subject to Roman law, and that Roman law would excuse them from the obligation to bring
their cens to their Seigneur. Ibid., 164. They may well have been right that Roman law would have
excused them.
55. Ibid., 170.
56. See, e.g., by [P.P.N.] Henrion de Pansey, Dissertations Feodales, 2 vols. (Paris: Th6ophile
Barrois le jeune, 1789), 1:287; C. Pocquet de Livoniere, Traito' des Fiefs, 2d ed. (Paris: J.-B. Coignard,
1733), 537; F. Bourjon, Le Droit Commun de la France et la Coutume de Paris Rdduits en Principes,
2 vols. (Paris: Grangd/Rouy, 1747), 1:227.
57. Reported in C. Blondeau & G. Gueret, eds., Journal du Palais, ou Recueil des Principales
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legal thought of the eighteenth century,58 and so well-established was the
orthodoxy that authorities tended to use virtually the same terms to describe
the law. In line with the decision of 1682, most legal authorities continued
to insist that feudal rents must always be portable, that vassals had in
general the obligation to present themselves "at the chateau or principle
manor of the seigneur."59  These authorities invariably linked the
portabilitglqugrabilitg question to Dumoulin's formula on the "requirement
of showing honor and respect." The seigneurial "cens" was that payment
which was owed to a seigneur as a sign of his seigneurial status---"in
signum superioritatis," as jurists often put it.60 There is little point in
extensively citing authorities whose accounts were fundamentally similar.
We may simply take one example with the dramatic date 1789, which
summarized the orthodoxy as it had been understood for a century-and
which also captured some of the intense social anxiety that the orthodoxy
embodied. Here writes Henrion de Pansey:
The cens is not requ6rable, in other words it is rendable & portable.
This is the rule.
Dumoulin gives the reason in the following terms: This is not a mere
pecuniary debt. It has attached to it the showing of honor and
respect.
M. Chabrol develops the text of Dumoulin in the following way: 'The
cens consists in Honor & Respect. It would not be appropriate if the
seigneur were obliged to go to the house of his vassal and request a
payment which is due to him as a sign of subjection and homage. In
general, it would seem just as revolting if a vassal should pretend that
he has been liberated from the portability of the cens, as if a vassal
were to imagine that his feudal lord was obliged to come find him at
his home in order to receive his profession of faith and homage.'
6'
It is remarkable how loudly the social concerns of the Reformation
continue to echo in this passage, even when explicitly Christian argument
has fallen by the wayside. Authors like this, who regarded the idea of
58. See Mackrell, Attack on 'Feudalism.' As Pothier summed up post-Dumoulinian French learning
on the meaning of the "dominium directum": "La seigneurie directe que retient le seigneur sur l'heritage
qu'est tenu de lui en fief, est une seigneurie purement d'honneur .. " Quoted in Bastier, La Fiodaliti
au Sikcle des Lumikres, 208. For similar passages, see, e.g., Pocquet de Livoni~re, Traitd des Fiefs,
533: "Le cens emporte & d6note la Seigneurie directe; c'est une reconnoissance de l'ob6issance & de
la sujettion du Censitaire, & de la suptiorit6 du Seigneur."; Boujon, Droit Commun de la France,
1:226.
59. Rule stated, e.g., in Preudhomme, TraitM des Droits Appartenans aux Seigneurs sur les Biens
Possdis en Roture; Avec l'application des Coutumes, des Dicisions du Conseil & des Arrgts de la
Cour; la maniare d'intenter les actions qui ont rapport a cette maniare, & d'y ddfendre: le tout suivant
le Droit Commun, & la Jurisprudence actuelle (Paris: Froull6, 1781), 113. For a southern authority,
see [M. de la Touloubre], Collection de Jurisprudence sur les Matiares Flodales et les Droits
Seigneuriaux, nouv. dd. (Avignon, 1773), 2:238ff, with discussion of decrees and decisions throughout
the south.
60. See here Henrys, Recueil d'Arrets Remarquables, 162.
61. Henrion de Pansey, Dissertations Fdodales, 1:286.
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querabiliti as "revolting," represented the dominant line in the eighteenth
century.
But to say that there was a classic orthodoxy is not to say that there were
no radicals who wished to push further. The eighteenth century also saw
some remarkable Dumoulinian radicalism in the decades immediately
before the Revolution, radicalism that pushed the tradition beyond anything
the orthodox tradition was ready to accept.62  In these last prerevolution-
ary decades, jurists went well beyond the Dumoulinian claim that where
there was a cens by custom, it should always be portable. They began to
claim that even where by custom no cens existed, one should be created by
operation of law, in the name of maintaining proper seigneurial order. This
argument arose with a kind of inevitable logic from the basic position
established by Dumoulin. If the cens was truly the "signum superioritatis,"
the sign of a seigneur's superior status, then every seigneur ought to be
able to claim one. But this was a shocking logic to the ears of early
modern jurists, since it involved the enforcement of rights for which there
was no customary authority. It is thus not surprising that there was no
sixteenth-century authority for the notion that a new cens could be institut-
ed through this sort of fiendishly uncustomary logic.
63
But by the eighteenth century, French jurists, apparently inspired by
royal efforts to establish the authority of the crown as feudal overlord of
the south,64 as well as by the rationalizing drift of the day, were more
62. For the transition from seventeenth to eighteenth centuries as a transition from antitax rebellion
to anti-seigneurial-dues rebellion, see R. Chartier, "Culture populaire et culture politique dans l'Ancien
Rhgime: quelques rbflexions," in Baker, ed., The French Revolution and the Creation of Modern
Political Culture, 250ff. H. Root, "Challenging the Seigneurie: Community and Contention on the Eve
of the French Revolution," Journal of Modem History 57 (Dec., 1985): 681, argues that the
intensification of dues took place-if at all-in the seventeenth and not the eighteenth century. This
is belied by Schmale's figures, cited note 49.
63. Contrast Schmale, Bauerlicher Widerstand, 145-46, who, in my view, takes too seriously
eighteenth-century claims that this sort of innovative cens had already been imposed in the sixteenth
century. Closely read, the sixteenth-century authorities are easily distinguishable. The case of the
Religieux of Reaulieu prhs Compiegne, for example, recounted in G. Louet, Recueil d'Aucuns Notables
Arrests donnez en la Courde Parlement de Paris, 6th ed. (Paris, 1620), 124-34, seems to have involved
written title; and, honestly read, the oft-cited Ordinance of Rousillon was not much help, since it
concerned only the treatment of existing rights. That this reasoning was new is also suggested by the
pre-mid-century commentaries on the critical Article 85 of the Custom of Paris, which dealt only with
minor points of interpretation. See, e.g., MI. Tournet, Coustumes de la Prevost6 et Vicomtd de Paris
(Paris: Michel Bobin, 1641), 110-12; C. de Ferrihre (rev. M. Sauvan d'Arainon), Nouveau Commentaire
sur la Coutume de la Prevosti et Vicomti de Paris, 2 vols. (Paris: Guillaume Cavelier, 1719), 1:165-66.
64. This radical line of jurisprudence developed as the crown tried to establish its "directe
universelle," its status as feudal overlord in the south of France. A politically important arrht de conseil
of 1746 declared Agen, Condom, and Marmande to be obliged to the King as "universal seigneur"
("sous la directe universelle du Roi"); and continued by holding that "cette directe emporte
nrcessairement un cens recognitif." Accordingly the conseil ordered "en consequence que dans les lieux
ob la perception du cens peut avoir t6 interrompue, il en sera imposd de nouveau." See Henrion de
Pansey, Dissertations Fdodales, 1:269, cited by the famous feudiste La Poix de Freminville, and
subsequently repeated in the juristic literature. For La Poix de Fr~minville's importance, see, e.g., A.
Soboul, "De la pratique des terriers A la veille de la Revolution," Annales E.S.C. 19 (1964): 1051. For
the political background to this arret, which stretched back generations, see F. Loirette, 'The Defense
of the Allodium in Seventeenth-Century Agenais: An Episode in the Local Resistance to Encroaching
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ready to follow logic where it might lead them. Typical was the marvelous
Frangois Bourjon, whose "Droit Commun de France" of 1747 was intended
to bring Cartesian method to the longstanding French project of developing
a unified customary law for all France. Bourjon laid out the basic line of
reasoning about introducing the unprecedented cens, not only for the King,
but also for seigneurs.65 All French real property was to be presumed
seigneurial property, subject to a portable cens.66 Even fiefs, in the
absence of title to the contrary, were thus to be, as it were, "censivized,"
made subject to a cens. Bourjon's argument for this radical reordering of
France's real property shows how deeply French intellectual life had moved
away from the concerns of the Reformation in the direction of physiocratic
economics. Universalizing the cens, argued Bourjon, was a good thing,
because to do so would tend to make these formerly feudal properties
economically freer. 67 This could do no economic harm: because it was
by definition modest in size, the cens did not belong to the world of
economic calculus, but to the world of honor.68 Making all French
properties censives would thus reconcile the economy of money with the
economy of honor, regularizing and solidifying the French system of honor
without imposing costs that might endanger financial liberalization.
Dumoulin had sought to cabin off the sphere of the economic in order to
emphasize the importance of the sphere of honor, assimilating censives as
closely as possible to fiefs. Bourjon, by contrast, here sought to cabin off
the sphere of honor, assimilating fiefs as closely as possible to censives.
Bourjon's goal was, of course, to emphasize the importance of the sphere
of the economic.
The desirable state of economic affairs Bourjon hoped to promote could
not, however, be achieved unless and until the cens could be introduced
into a huge number of properties in which no cens was customary. Was
that legal? Here came an extremely important point in Bourjon's
reasoning. Introducing an unprecedented cens was indeed legal, held
Bourjon, because the cens, like all historically feudal rights, was impre-
scriptible. Even if the right to the cens had not been claimed for thousands
of years, that right could not be lost. This idea of the imprescriptibility of
the cens was old, but the conclusion Bourjon drew from it was not: merely
Royal Power," in R.F. Kierstead, ed., State and Society in Seventeenth-Century France (New York,
1975), 181, 192 and passim. Loirette discusses only archival records and not the very significant impact
of this arret on late-eighteenth-century juristic thought.
65. Bourjon, Droit Commun de la France, 1:226: "Cette charge est une suite nrcessaire de la
maxime, nulle terre sans Seigneur, nul franc-aleu sans titre; ainsi tout hritage est prrsum6 tenu A cens
si il n'y a titre contraire."
66. Ibid. (the universality of the cens); 1:227 (its portabilite).
67. Ibid., 1:226. To Bourjon this reflected in part the presumption in favor of liberty, since it
meant that the properties in question were seigneurial rather than feudal.
68. This is, as it were, the converse of the proposition enunciated by Root, "Challenging the
Seigneurie," 654: "As feudal dues became residual they became detestable."
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on the strength of his status as seigneur, a seigneur could always claim his
modest cens, the sign of his superiority, even if he could point to no
custom, no ancestor, no tradition. Prescription could never argue against
this historically feudal right.69
Bourjon's radical line of reasoning was very widespread indeed from the
mid-eighteenth century onward (though lawyers naturally challenged it).7"
The critical subsidiary points-first, that the cens was by definition modest,
merely a matter of honor and not of gain; and second, that the right to a
cens was wholly imprescriptible-were more or less universally accept-
ed.71  The larger conclusion-that an unprecedented cens could, in
absence of title to the contrary, in principle always be instituted-was also
widely accepted after mid-century, by jurists if not clearly by courts.72
The state of affairs around mid-century was nicely summarized by J.B.
D6nisart in 1775. By that time it was clear that juristic logic dictated that
all seigneurs could, in principle, claim a cens with hope of success.
D6nisart recited the standard reasoning. The cens was a modest annual
payment, sometimes in cash, sometimes in kind.73 It was, however, not
simply a payment: "It contains within itself a sort of right to honor.' ' 74 In
all northern, and many southern, parts of France, the right to the cens was
non-prescriptible. 75  As a non-prescriptible and modest sum, the cens
could be claimed by any seigneur purely on the strength of "sa qualit6 de
seigneur f6odal."
Nor was this right merely theoretical. D6nisart cited 1753 litigation
which confirmed a seigneur's right to such a cens, along with twenty-nine
years of arrearages, though he also cited a decision to the contrary.
76
Other authors cited other decisions.77 Together, these decisions make it
clear that after about 1750, it became in principle possible for French
seigneurs to claim wholly unprecedented cens, along with twenty-nine
years' arrearages.
69. Bouron, Droit Commun de la France, 1:226-27.
70. Cf. Root, Peasants and King in Burgundy, 191-92 (some lawyers try to argue against
prescriptibility where rights are not uniform).
71. For examples of modicite, see, e.g., Pocquet de Livoniere, Traitl des Fiefs, 534. For examples
of imprescriptibility, see, e.g., Guyot, Traitd des Fiefs, 2:16ff; Pocquet de Livoniere, Traite des Fiefs,
533; I. Brodeau, Coustume de la Prevost6 et Vicomtdf de Paris (Paris, 1669), 1:481-82; and generally
Schmale, Bauerlicher Widerstand, 145.
72. It is significant that Pocquet de Livoniere, Traiti des Fiefs, makes no mention of this issue in
1733. This is the only major issue upon which Pocquet de Livoniere does not touch.
73. J. B. Dnisart, Collection de Ddcisions Nouvelles et de Notions Relatives a la Jurisprudence
Actuelle, 9th ed. (Paris: Desaint, 1775), 1:315. Dnisart shrewdly observed that the low value of the
cens was probably the result of sixteenth-century inflation.
74. Ibid.
75. Although the arrearages and the "quotit" were prescriptible after thirty years. Ibid., 318.
76. Ibid., 317.
77. Henrion de Pansey, Dissertations Fdodales, 1:269.
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To my knowledge, there was no large number of these cases, and there
were undoubtedly more unfavorable than favorable decisions.78 But the
favorable decisions exercised a special fascination for French jurists, and
it is easy to see why. These were the decisions that pushed the juristic
logic to its limits. Moreover, the result of these decisions must surely have
been one of the more humiliating and affronting experiences offered by
modem legal systems. Numbers of Frenchmen were forced to submit to
the payment of cens their predecessors in title had never had to pay-and
forced to pay a cens portable, which meant that once every year they had
to present themselves at the chateau of some lord in order to show him
respect. 79
IV
By the eve of the Revolution, French jurists thus had behind them three
centuries of efforts to neutralize the acid of Roman debtor-creditor analysis,
distinguishing seigneurs from creditors by guaranteeing the former a show
of respect. During the period after mid-century, these efforts had grown to
such a level of intensity that at least a few Frenchmen who never before
had paid the cens were being forced to make an annual trip to the chateau
of their seigneur in order to make a show of respect, carrying with them,
the first time, twenty-nine years of arrearages. That such a humiliating
duty could be imposed on Frenchmen, with so little customary authority,
is a measure of how intensely the French juristic community wished to
safeguard the system of honor and respect against any threat of infection
from Roman debtor-creditor rules. "Romanization" of any straightforward
kind simply did not take place in the prerevolutionary countryside.
To be sure, there was also a more deeply romanizing tradition which
insisted that according to principles of Roman law, seigneurs were mere
creditors who were obliged to come fetch their payments as other creditors
did. In particular, there was the fine author Boutaric, who was strongly
committed to using Roman law as the basic source for supplementing
French customs. So radical was this author that, at times, he seemed ready
to drop the requirement of respect entirely, and he was prepared to argue,
78. See the cases summarized by M. Chapsal, Discours Historiques sur la Fdodaliti et I'Allodialit6;
suivis de Dissertations sur le Franc-Aleu des Coutumes d Auvergne, de Bourbonnois, du Berry, de
Champagne, et principalement our la partie de cette Province r6gie par la Coutume de Vitry (Paris,
1789), 185-89 (also discussed by Ddnisart), 271-72.
79. This could, of course, cut both ways. Thus Pothier declared "c'est abusiv et improprement que,
dans nos coutumes, les crbanciers de rente foncire sont appelrs seigneurs de rente fonci~re." Quoted
in Piret, Rencontre chez Pothier, 149-50; cf. Salviat's efforts to insist that the title "Seigneur" be limited
to "celui A qui appartient une rente fonci~re." Quoted and discussed in Schmale, Bauerlicher
Widerstand, 69 n. 70.
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contrary to prevailing authority, that the cens was normally querable80
There may have been a few others, too.
Still, I think it is fair to say that this radical romanizing tradition was
weak; it is a mistake (sadly made by one leading historian"1) to treat
Boutaric as typical. Jurists tended to be very hesitant indeed about
applying Roman principles. To find really vigorous Roman law radicalism,
we must abandon the technical juristic literature, and turn to pseudo-juristic
philosophical history. We must look, for example, to the unoriginal but
often ingenious M. Chapsal, whose Discours Historiques sur la Fjodalitj
appeared in 1789. In that work, a universal history in the Montesquieuian
tradition, Chapsal attacked the pretensions of seigneurs, contrasting them
unfavorably with creditors. Seigneurs, wrote Chapsal, following good
enlightened tradition, had their status only through usurpation. 2 Credi-
tors, by contrast, were merely exercising the most historically just of rights,
drawn from the earliest days of Roman law. Chapsal imagined a world of
early society in which most persons lived from their private property. But:
Society having once been established, there may have been individuals
who, because they had managed their property badly, had no means
of providing for their needs, and who accordingly were obliged to
borrow. The laws of the society thus needed to legislate about
repayment, and creditors were doubtless permitted to force their
debtors to cede property in proportion to the loan. The same laws of
society, in order to punish the idleness and bad faith of those who
borrowed beyond their means, could have permitted the creditor to
reduce his insolvent debtor to servitude.
"So it is," he added, "that laziness and neglect gave rise to inequality."
8 3
Nothing more natural and normal than debt-enslavement; it was seigneur-
ialism that was perverse! In this strange inversion of Luther's values, we
see true Enlightenment radicalism. Certainly it was much more radical than
anything France's jurists could offer-until we come to the Revolution.
For it was emphatically only with the shock of the Revolution that the
French jurists finally surrendered to the creditor analogy. To return to our
starting point: on August 4, 1789, the abolition of feudalism was pro-
claimed, and in the succeeding days, the Assembly produced its preliminary
legislation.84 Shortly thereafter, the Committee on Feudal Rights was
80. [F.] Boutaric, Traitd des Droits Seigneuriaux et de Matieres Feodales (Toulouse: Gaspard
Henault, 1745), 181-83.
81. R. Mousnier, The Institutions of France under the Absolute Monarchy 1598-1789, trans. B.
Pearce (Chicago, 1979), 1:494, seems clearly to rely too uncritically on Boutaric.
82. Chapsal, Discours Historiques, 148ff.
83. Ibid., 15-16.
84. That preliminary legislation, following the lines of French tradition, held that feudalism was
essentially a personal, and not a real, phenomenon: only personal rights were abolished, whereas real
rights were to be redeemable.
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constituted, and in the midst of growing tension in early 1790, the
Committee offered its countrymen the explanation that "the Seigneurs have
descended to the rank of simple Creditors."
85
I hope that some of the wealth of meaning in this phrase is clear after
what I have recounted in the foregoing pages. With this declaration, the
French legal community surrendered, after three centuries of resistance, to
"revolting" Roman debtor-creditor law, rupturing the wall of rank it had
erected between seigneurs and creditors.
And it was emphatically the French juristic community that spoke here,
not the Revolutionaries in general. This shows most clearly in the
Committee's treatment of the cens. The National Assembly's preliminary
legislation had provisionally abolished the cens as a purely feudal payment
and a much-hated one.86 Rather than concur in this abolition, the
Committee felt it necessary to reinstate the cens in a new-old form. The
cens, declared the Committee, had not been abolished, but transformed. It
was now merely once more a pecuniary debt. Pennies the cens might be,
but they were pennies that must be paid, because they were pennies that
were owed to a creditor. 87 This may seem to demonstrate how ruthless
the Committee was in its zeal to preserve the economic rights of the
seigneurs, but we must not forget that the cens was by definition of no
economic value, nor must we forget the social drama of the old rule
requiring vassals to bring their cens to their lord. The Committee's
decision to reinstate the cens had a large symbolic meaning. It undid all
the labors of the long Dumoulinian tradition, by insisting that coins were
merely money, not "tokens of superiority"; by making the cens yet another
payment that the creditor must simply seek from his debtor. It declared an
end to three centuries of efforts to maintain a ritual feudalism of honor
distinct from the world of commerce.
Indeed, it was in many ways radical work that the Committee did. Let
me now summarize precisely how we should understand the Committee's
work. The Committee's report was something much more far-reaching than
an ad hoc piece of counterrevolutionary pettifoggery. It was an attempt to
upset a system for the enforcement of respect that was of real importance
in France. It bears emphasizing that the cens had been extremely
prominent in prerevolutionary legal life: Frenchmen had been litigating
fiercely over the requirement of showing respect that the cens represented.
85. "Rapport fait A l'Assembl.e Nationale au Nom du Comitd de Fodalit de 8 Fdvrier 1790 par
M. Merlin, Drput6 de Douai," in Proc&s-Verbal de 1'Assemble Nationale, vol. 13 (Paris, n.d.), 7. "[Lies
censitaires ne sont pas ... d6chargrs de l'obligation de reconnoitre leurs Seigneurs: Seulement les
Seigneurs dtant descendus au rang de simple crdanciers de dettes foncieres, il ne peut plus 6tre exig6
des censitaires, d'autres reconnoissances, ni d'autres declarations, que si ceux-ci n'avoient t6
orginairement que D6biteurs ordinaires de prestations ou redevances r6elles."
86. See, e.g., Furet, "Night of August 4," 111.
87. See Garaud, La Revolution et la Propri&t; Foncire, 184.
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Eliminating seigneurial rights and substituting creditors' rights was a
dramatic and significant change.
If legal historians have failed to grasp how dramatic and significant the
work of the Committee was, that is because they have failed to grasp how
much honor and respect matter in the world. There is more to human
relations than cost; in this, as in a host of other aspects of the French legal
system (and other legal systems as well), the battles that parties fight are
often battles over their social and personal standing. The history of the
cens is also in one way peculiarly revealing. Making the cens a matter of
respect required Dumoulin and his followers to tease out social possibilities
in the very payment relationship itself. A shrewd lawyer like Dumoulin
could detect issues of honor even in this most seemingly financial of
relationships, merely by focusing on a superficially minor matter: who,
payor or payee, was obliged to come to whom?
The way that Dumoulin teased this hidden hierarchical issue out of the
payment relationship also suggests some conclusions about the ways in
which lawyers reason. Our standard accounts of the Revolution have
supposed that lawyers are basically technicians in the business of applying
conceptualizations, with little regard for the social consequences of what
they do. But Dumoulin and the powerful members of the French legal
profession who followed him did not serve as the technician-agents of the
spread of destructive Roman concepts. To be sure, those Roman concepts
were around, and to be sure those concepts did have something of a
destructive effect. In particular, the "creditor" concept was around, and it
had the effect of offering authority for the substitution of one-sided liability
where there had once been two-sided loyalty. If the "creditor" concept had
spread unchecked, it might well have transformed France into a debtor-
creditor order, as the standard accounts suggest.
But the "creditor" concept did not spread unchecked. It did not spread
unchecked, at least in part, because the legal profession was not interested
just in technical conceptualization. The legal profession was interested in
much grander issues of social order. Dumoulin and the lawyers who
followed him were perfectly well aware of the danger of commercialization,
and, stirred at first by Reformation visions of a healthy Christian-feudal
order, they displayed great shrewdness and theoretical sophistication in
defending and enforcing "honor and respect." They built, in fact, a whole
edifice of feudal rights that could continue to exist alongside the edifice of
creditors' rights.
French legal reasoning was thus not (or at least not always) about
technical conceptualization. French lawyers did not just fill gaps, nor did
they simply try to solve the dispute before them. They tried to integrate
the parties before them into a larger social order-in this case, a larger
social order of honor and respect. They reasoned about the way society
should be constituted as a whole. That such was the case in France can be
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elegantly illustrated with yet another example from the same eighteenth-
century French legal community, an example with which I close. Here is
how a M. Muyart de Vouglans, of the bar of the Parlement of Paris,
explained in 1767 why Beccaria's enlightened principles of equality before
the law did not apply in France:
The author pretends ... that it is unnecessary, in imposing punish-
ments, to consider the Quality of the person against whom the crime
has been committed; and gives as a reason that all men depend equally
upon the society of which they are members. He also wishes, for the
same reason, that persons of the highest rank be punished in the same
way as the least of Citizens.
One senses all the danger and absurdity of such a principle. It is
not only contrary to the disposition of the laws, which have always
distinguished according to the Quality of persons in establishing
penalties; and to daily experience, which teaches us that, as persons
of a higher condition hold honor dearer than life itself, the imposition
of a simple shameful punishment makes a deeper impression upon
them than corporal punishments make on persons of low condition; it
is also contrary to the author's own system, since the public interest,
which he wants to place so much at the center of analysis, demands
that one have particular regard for noble persons and persons with
dignity, the extinction or blemishing of which can not fail to cause
damage to society.
88
The great issue, in prerevolutionary French legal reasoning, was not legal
technique, not justice, not philosophy, not elegance of reasoning. The great
issue was the fundamental values of "la socit6," as articulated and
enforced by juristic minds such as Dumoulin and Muyart de Vouglans; that
sociitg was one that would not, until the great Revolution came, tolerate
blemishes upon the dignity of its noble persons.
POSTSCRIPT
But of course the great blemish of the Revolution did finally come to
France. That fact brings me to this Postscript, in which I want to compare
France with the very different German-speaking world. German lawyers
had very different social visions from French ones, and they developed a
jurisprudential tradition very different from that of the French. German
jurisprudence never concerned itself with the definition or enforcement of
respect, the way French jurisprudence did, and respect was, in some sense,
not abolished in Germany during the revolutionary period. The dignity of
the German seigneurial class survived the Revolution largely without
88. Muyart de Vouglans, Avocat au Parlement, RWfutation des Principes hasards dans le Traitd
des D6lits et Peines, traduit de l'talien (1767), 103-04. My thanks to Mirjan Damaska for bringing
this book to my attention.
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blemish. This makes for a contrast that I want to develop in this Postscript,
as a way of gaining a better purchase on just how important the peculiar
focus of the French legal profession on "honor and respect" was in setting
the stage for the Revolution.
Early modern German jurists faced the same difficulties as their French
counterparts in using Roman law to analyze seigneurial rights. At first,
they followed a similar path of Roman legal analysis; through the
seventeenth century German jurists seem, by and large, to have accepted
the "creditor" analogy, Luther's railings, and severe difficulties in the
Thirty Years' War notwithstanding. 9
Yet if pre-eighteenth-century Germans accepted the "creditor" analogy,
they did not cite Dumoulin, or grand French ideas about "honor and
respect" more generally.' In the German seventeenth century, there was
never any doctrine that the cens had to be a small payment symbolizing
honor value as opposed to money value. The very word "cens" in
German-"Zins"--came, strikingly enough, normally to mean "interest
payment," what it continues to mean to this day.9' The cens in Germany
was a payment made not to seigneurs, but to creditors. Indeed, more
broadly, seventeenth-century Germans never seem to have developed
anything like the elaborate French debate over respect and its enforce-
ment.92
If German jurisprudence had already taken a significantly different
direction from French in the seventeenth century, the differences were
magnified at the beginning of the eighteenth. At that time, as a number of
historians have noted, German jurists moved sharply away from the old
"creditor" analogy in the direction of the "servitude" analogy: 93 German
89. See especially those pamphlets dealing with the spectacular ruination at the end of the Thirty
Years' War; e.g., Caspar Manzius, Praeludium Belli Civilis inter Rigorosos Creditores & Calamitosos
Debitores super Censibus et Pensionibus praeteritorum Annorum (Ingolstadt: Typii Gregorii Haelini,
1642), 115-21; P. Zorer, Rechtmassiges Bedencken und ohnvorgreiffliche Vorschlage Uber etliche bey
jetzigem bewusten zerritten und ruinirten Zustandi der Herrschaffien und Unterthanen in dem Heil.
Rdm. Reich vor den Gerichten und Obrigkeiten hin: und wider viefiltig vorfallende Fragen, 2d ed.
(NUrnberg: bey und in Verlegung Jeremiae Dimlers, 1651), e.g. 121; lohan.-Ottonis Taboris, De
Praesidiis Debitorum Egentium (Strasbourg: J. Andrea, 1646), 2r-v. A number of pamphlets on the
issue of the German cens at the end of the Thirty Years' War are bound together in a volume in the
Staatsbibliothek Berlin, Haus 2, with the call number Gy 555' .
90. See, e.g., Manzius, Praeludium Beli Civilis, 6.
91. See, e.g., ibid., 7.
92. To be sure, the German jurists, like their French counterparts, were aware of the traditions of
feudal loyalty. But, unlike the French jurists, the Germans never developed any system of the legal
enforcement of respect; nor any Dumoulinian or Montesquieuian grand theory of honor. On the
contrary, German jurists contented themselves with repeating empty feudal formulas, for which they
proposed no enforcement mechanism. For such a formula, see, e.g., G.G. Titius, Das Teutsche Lehn-
Recht Nach Seiner eigenen Beschaffenheit und Verfassung des Teutschen Stats, 2d ed. (Leipzig, 1707),
66-67.
93. See especially G.G. Titius, "Dissertatio de Servitute Faciendi," in D.D. Bartholomaei Caepollae,
Tractatus de Servitutibus (Lausanne/Geneva: Sumpt. Marci-Micharlis Bousquet & Socior., 1756), 555-
72. Cf. already Titius, Das Teutsche Lehn-Recht, 367, attacking the doctrine of "tacit" mortgages. See
also the literature collected in Whitman, Legacy of Roman Law, 169 n. 75.
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jurists shifted from calling seigneurs "creditors" to calling them "owners."
Why this shift took place is a difficult problem, which I cannot fully solve
here-though I believe the short answer is "Enlightenment," and in
particular Saxon Enlightenment. 94  (For my purposes here, I would,
however, like to note that this difference between Germany and France
shows how much historians oversimplify when they speak of the "recep-
tion" of some single corpus of commercializing Roman law.)
The result, at any rate, was that by the time of the Revolution Germans
had no tradition of the sort of jurisprudence of respect that the French had;
no one had ever much discussed how one went about enforcing "honor and
respect," or what it would mean to "la socit" to do so. The German
difference was noted in the 1760s by a jurist named Goetsmann, who
described seigneurial practices in Alsace for a French readership.
Goetsmann described what, by the mid-eighteenth century, had become a
striking socio-legal contrast:
The feudal regime, as it exists in Germany, is the authority of a
certain number of Seigneurs, subordinated to each other by the right
of birth, and by the possession of certain lands; it is the servitude of
one piece of real property to another piece of real property [c'est la
servitude d'une terre, sous une autre terrel.
Many politically-aware persons [Politiques] in France believe that
there are serious defects in this sort of regime; the feudal regime, they
say consists purely in the authority of a seigneur over his vas-
sals ......
So different was Germany from France that Goetsmann expected his French
readers to find the German system nothing less than subversive.96 "The
feudal regime" was, in the mind of the French, purely about "authority";
it was positively dangerous to mix it with real rights, with the German idea
94. The shift to the "servitude" analogy seems to have come among Saxon scholars who had both
the intellectual concerns, and possibly also the humanitarian concerns, of the state that was the great
center of German Enlightenment in the early eighteenth century. Enlightenment, among these scholars,
meant in large part an intellectual determination to mount more correct descriptions of the world around
them. This meant emphasizing what had always been clear: the heavily real character of feudal
properties, in which there was, after all, a lively real estate market. Also at work may have been the
old liability concerns, now presented in the context of the Great Northern War, which devastated
Saxony immediately before Saxon jurists moved to the "servitude" analogy and its less far-reaching
principles of liability.
The "servitude" analogy also had some conceptual advantages. In particular, it meant that jurists
could consolidate the treatment of rents with the treatment of other feudal rights. See Whitman, Legacy
of Roman Law, 170. The author of one letter to the Committee on Feudal Rights noted this important
consequence of using the servitude analogy: see C.G.H., "Observations relatives au Decret de
l'assemblde nationale des 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. et 11. aoust 1789 portans abolition du regime feodal," 13
December 1789, in Archives Nationales D XIV 13, 94 Piece 6.
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of "the servitude of one piece of real property to another piece of real
property."
A world of social difference was thus reflected in the differing doctrines
of France and Germany by the end of the eighteenth century. This
difference came fully to the fore when France spilled over the Rhine into
Germany at the turn of the century. When Revolutionary and Napoleonic
regimes attempted to extend the reach of French abolition legislation into
regions historically governed by German law, it was, strikingly, possible for
German lawyers to claim that the French abolition simply did not apply in
their lands. The French abolition, German jurists argued, had been an
abolition of a system of honor and respect, whereas the German system
had, in law, never been any such thing.
Thus one pamphleteer wrote that French legislation could not possibly
apply in Alsace (French, but ruled by "Germanic law",97) in part because
by French definitions a seigneurial right was recognized by its "modest
amount." German payments were real payments, not "modest" ones;
accordingly a wide range of Alsatian obligations had to be regarded as not
abolished.98 Another author, equally eager to deny that French legislation
applied to differently conceptualized German rights,99 explained that the
French legislation had only abolished those payments which represented a
"pure evidence of honor." ° This sharply limited-indeed, practically
nullified-the effect of the French legislation in Germany. For there were
simply not seigneurial rights that fit the forms of French analysis to be
found in Germany:
Not every payment [Zins] has been abolished in France. Rather, it is
only those which have their immediate origin in the feudal system.
In order to distinguish such a payment from all the others, I want to
offer here a few marks, by which French jurists sought to make feudal
payments particularly recognizable.
Since the seigneurial cens [Zins] was paid merely with the purpose of
representing a ceremonial recognition of seigneurial rights, the cens
was regarded, with respect to the seigneur, more as a mark of honor
than as valuable income.
The cens was more a matter of honor than profit.'0'
97. Traitd sur la Nature des Biens Ruraux dans les deux Dipartements du Rhin, ci-devant Province
d'Alsace (Strasbourg: Andr6 Ulrich, n.d. [after law of 17 juillet 1793]).
98. Ibid., 11-12.
99. A. Stiindeck, Historisch-Juridische Abhandlung Uber die Abschaffung der Lehns-Verfassung in
Frankreich. Nebst praktischer Abwendung derselben auf die im Ruhr-Departement unter dem Namen
Leibgewinns und unter ahnlichen Namen bekannten Abgaben (Crefeld: Schtiller, 1805), iv. This author
could be quite as passionate about creditors' rights as his German predecessors of the Thirty Years'
War. See ibid., vii.
100. Ibid., 2-3.
101. Stiundeck, Historisch-Juridische Abhandlung, 42-43.
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German obligations, however, simply did not fit the French juristic model,
and French legislation had correspondingly small application to German
feudalism.'0 2
Germans thus never defined feudalism as a system of "honor and
respect," and that fact allowed at least some lawyers to combat French
abolition legislation during the revolutionary period. The edifice of "honor
and respect" that was torn down in France was not there to be torn down
in Germany: Germany was simply never a land in which feudalism was
legally defined and enforced as a system of respect.
Moreover, if Germans never defined respect, one can say that they never
abolished it either, during the revolutionary period or after. It is a
commonplace of comparative history that the German nobles managed to
keep their grasp on status and power long after their French counterparts
had been forced to yield.'0 3 German politics continued to be characterized
by an atmosphere of seigneurialism until 1933; indeed there is a body of
opinion which blames the disaster of 1933 squarely on the failure of the
Revolution to dispose of the social power of German seigneurs: it was, so
runs the argument, the catastrophic marriage of modernization with lasting
seigneurialism that explains how badly wrong German society went. 4
That may or may not be true, but it is surely true that seigneurial
hierarchy survived the revolutionary period in Germany better than it did
in France. "Honor and respect" were, in some sense, never abolished in
Germany. And that offers us meat for some speculative comparative
conclusions.
What happened in France that did not happen in Germany? Can we say
that the French lawyers, by focusing so squarely on "honor and respect,"
smoothed the way for an abolition of respect that never came to Germany?
On one level it is quite easy to see how the work of the French lawyers
might have smoothed the way for the Revolution. The French lawyers may
simply have stirred what Americans call, using an analytic concept that
deserves greater play in legal history, "backlash." The enforcement
mechanisms that French lawyers developed were fairly obnoxious, as we
have seen. By the eve of the Revolution, the pitiless Dumoulinian
radicalism of French lawyers was forcing at least some Frenchmen to
perform ritual respect, for the first time, before lords who never before had
102. As Sttindeck observed, there was no ban on surcens in Germany, and the rule "nulle terre sans
seigneur" had no application. Ibid., 44. For the French difference, see, e.g., the discussion of surcens
in Bastier, La Fe'odalitd au Sicle des Lumihres, 209.
103. For the lasting strength of the German nobility, see, e.g., D. Lieven, The Aristocracy in
Europe, 1815-1914 (London, 1992), 243-44; A. Mayer, The Persistence of the Old Regime: Europe to
the Great War (New York, 1981), 101-02.
104. For a recent version of this thesis, see H.-U. Wehler, The German Empire, 1871-1918, trans.
K. Traynor (Leamington Spa, 1985), 245-46.
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had the right to act as lords. Perhaps, as a result, the doctrine of portabilitg
made a few friends for the Revolution.
But I think we can see that the lawyers also had a less direct, but
possibly more important, impact on a theoretical level. That less direct
impact lay in the very act of defining "feudalism." Defining "feudalism"
tended to endanger it, simply by creating a convenient target for abolition-
ists. This, is clear partly from the work of the Committee itself. When the
Committee finally analyzed the meaning of "feudalism," it inevitably took
its definitions from the legal bookshelf: the Committee abolished feudalism
as an order of "honor and respect," because its lawyer-predecessors had
defined feudalism that way. The edifice that the Committee tore down was
the edifice that lawyers had built.
The point can, moreover, perhaps be carried further. What is true of the
Committee alone is arguably true of the whole Revolution. Because
prerevolutionary lawyers had spoken of feudalism as a system of "honor
and respect," it was "honor and respect" that the French Revolution
abolished. Even beyond the cens itself,"°5 even beyond the work of the
Committee on Feudal Rights in 1789-90, the effect of the Revolution was
to eliminate, to a startling degree, the honor-obsessed social order of the
ancien regime while bringing, in the early nineteenth century, a very high
degree indeed of commercialization. After the Revolution, the social
prominence of French aristocrats was largely gone--especially by contrast
with Germany. The impact of the ancien regime lawyers can surely be
detected here, including the impact of the greatest lawyer-theorist of
"honor," Montesquieu. Through long efforts at definition and articulation,
prerevolutionary lawyers had explained how it was that "honor" character-
ized the ancien regime at its deepest level. Had they never done so, the
Revolution might not easily have proceeded in the way that it did, for it
would not have had a defined target.
Germany was different. Ancien regime German jurists did not define or
enforce feudalism as a system of respect. That does not mean that the
Germans did not have a functioning system of feudal respect. On the
contrary: it likely means that the Germans had a social system of feudal
respect that functioned so well that it needed little by way of enforcement
mechanisms. The German lawyers spent little time worrying about respect
because respect was never in any great danger in German society.
Conversely, the fact that French lawyers worried so much about respect
may reflect the fact that respect was in danger in French society, on some
level, as a result of the spread of Roman law liability as well as of other
forces.
105. For a representative list of other honorific rights abolished, see van den Heuvel, "Feodalit6,
Fdodal," 7.
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But we would be wrong to conclude, from that, that law merely reflects
social forces. For I think the comparison with Germany gives us a clue to
an importance in what the French lawyers had done that went well beyond
mere reflection of any relative weakness of the order of respect in France.
The work of the French lawyers did not just reflect a social conflict; it
articulated a social conflict, and enforced the claims of one party to that
conflict. And that mattered when the day of abolition arrived, for nothing
can be abolished that has not first been defined. What the French lawyers
did was what lawyers are best at: they put the conflict into words, and into
court. A conflict that has been put into words, and put into court, is a
conflict that can become the object of political struggle in a way that vague
and inchoate social forces cannot.
The ultimate effect of the work of the French lawyers, I would
accordingly propose, was to take conflicts over honor and respect out of the
vague and ill-thought-through world of social relations, where they lay in
Germany, and to place those questions on the political agenda. No political
actor in eighteenth-century Germany thought very clearly about issues of
honor and respect, just as no political actor in America today thinks very
clearly about issues of honor and respect. This is not because those issues
are not present, but because they have not been articulated in the right way;
we remain deeply wedded to a sort of Millian view of the world, which
declares questions of honor to be a matter strictly for social sanctions,
never for legal ones.' °6 French law took a different course. This does
not mean that French law reflected politics. It means something quite
different: French law created politics out of the raw matter of inarticulate
social conflict. French law took issues that were the basis of unspoken
daily resentment and petty friction, described those issues clearly in words
and gave them plastic and dramatic representation in court. As a result,
those issues could be the basis of party programs. Had French law not
done this work of articulation, we may speculate that the Revolution might
have taken different forms.
106. Cf. J.S. Mill, On Liberty, ed. C. Shields (Indianapolis, 1956), 93-95. For a different view of
the legal world, much more conscious of the prominence of the honor-interest in most legal systems,
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